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I. INTRODUCTION
The American journalist, Ambrose Bierce, introduced satirical
definitions into his columns in 1875 under the heading "The Demon's
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Dictionary."' The title was altered slightly to "The Devil's Dictionary"
when it was first published in 1911 as Volume VII of The Collected Works
of Ambrose Bierce.2
In the work by Bierce, the word "academe" is defined as "[a]n ancient
school where morality and philosophy were taught, 3 while the word
"academy" is defined as "a modem school where football is taught."4 The
story goes that two years after the publication of the dictionary in book
form, Bierce ventured into revolution-tom Mexico and was never heard
from again.' But even nearly a hundred years ago, Bierce had it right. In the
modem Academy, football is not only taught, but is wound into the fabric
of many institutions. And for many alumni and followers, the fortunes of
the football team dictate how they feel about the school.
At those institutions, and in those athletic conferences, where college
football is King, there is nothing like the word of an NCAA investigation
to strike fear in the hearts of the faithful and stir the salacious nature of
members of the press. Although thoughtful people try to steer others back

1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY, Note (1993).

2. Id.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id.
5. Id. at Note.
6. Although most readers will have some familiarity with the NCAA, the following passage
is provided for those who are new to the game.
The NCAA was founded in 1906 in response to excessive violence in college
football. President Theodore Roosevelt, concerned about deaths and injuries
resulting from mass-momentum plays such as "The Flying Wedge," summoned
college athletics leaders to two White House conferences to encourage reform.
In early December 1905, Chancellor Henry M. MacCracken of New York
University convened a meeting of 13 institutions to initiate changes to football
playing rules. On December 28 in New York City, the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States (IAAUS) was founded. The IAAUS was officially
constituted March 31, 1906, and became the National Collegiate Athletic
Association in 1910.
The Association served solely as a discussion and rules-making body in the
early years, but in 1921, the NCAA established its first championship--the
National Collegiate Track and Field Championships. Over the next 25 years, more
rules committees and championships were established, including the National
Collegiate Basketball Championship in 1939.
After World War II, abusive practices involving student-athletes became
prevalent, and the NCAA responded with the "Sanity Code," an attempt to create
guidelines for recruiting and financial aid. Other issues added to the unrest. The
membership was increasingly concerned about the effect that unrestricted
television might have on football attendance. The number of postseason football
games began to climb out of control.
Faced with a large number of new and complex issues, the rapidly growing
membership chose to develop a full-time staff. Walter Byers was named the
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to reality with entreaties such as "it's only a game" and "it's only college
football," individuals at the center of an NCAA investigation usually are
having none of it. What campus leaders know is that although some people
in another league or another part of the country may view college football
as only a game, for many people affiliated with the institution, it is THE
GAME. Through periods of dismal state funding, decreases in enrollment,
campus unrest, faculty and staff defections, and other negatives, the beacon
in the night may be the football team. So when an NCAA investigation
threatens a program with negative public attention and the possibility of
crippling sanctions, the institution is threatened and almost immediately,
people affiliated with the school step back and start looking for leadership.
A major NCAA infractions case will often bring more negative attention
to a university than nearly any other matter, consume calendars, obsess the
press, and take over as the subject of five of the top ten questions most
likely to be asked of a CEO when he or she talks to the governing board,
attends alumni events, and interacts with the public.
The purpose of this Essay is to examine some of the strategies, ethical
dilemmas, and moral conflicts in a major infractions case, as well as
examine some of the complexities in running an effective compliance
program in a major college athletic program. The authors approach this
task having been involved in major infractions cases not only as a faculty
athletic representative and compliance director, but also as a member of the
NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions and in a compliance position
in a major Division I-A conference office. This Essay is not a story of any
particular infractions case. There are many such works available in the
popular press. Some are interesting and offer valuable lessons for
university presidents and those who work in NCAA compliance.7 Others

Association's first executive director in 1951, and he established a national office
in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1952. The Byers years were marked by monumental
changes involving television, rules enforcement, and membership structure.
The NCAA established 10 women's championships beginning in the 1981-82
academic year. In 1981, the NCAA adopted an extensive governance plan to
include women's athletics programs, services and representation.
Byers retired in October 1987 and was replaced by Richard D. Shultz, who
served until 1993. Schultz was replaced by Cedric W. Dempsey, whose title was
changed to "president" in 1998. Today, the national office is based in
Indianapolis.
2002 NCAA Ad Hoc Review Committee Report, at 1, available at www.ncaa.org/library/
membership/adhoc_report/ad_hoc_report.pdf.
7. See, e.g., DAVID WHrrRRD, A PAYROLL TO MEET (1989) (telling the story of the
Southern Methodist University major infractions case in football). For additional insight into what
is probably the most famous infractions case in the history of the NCAA, see Report to the Board
of Trustees of Southern Methodist University from The Committee of Bishops (June 19, 1987) (on
file with authors).
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are tiresome, self-important and self-serving, written by individuals
implicated in an NCAA infractions case. The purpose here is to encourage
dialogue and introspection on the ethical and moral choices faced by
presidents, athletic directors (ADs), faculty athletic representatives (FARs),
senior woman administrators (SWAs), compliance directors, and others as
they weigh the interests of the institution, the NCAA, and their own
interest in complex and difficult major infractions cases, and try to run a
clean program in the face of competing interests.
The authors hope to provide some insight into compliance programs
and the infractions process from the perspective of insiders-individuals
who work in compliance on a day-to-day basis. It is not a "How To Guide"
for handling an infractions case from start to finish. But it is our hope to
provide some guidance and help to individuals inside programs who are
caught in the crossfire, where there is a struggle between individuals inside
and outside of the institution with a "win-at-all-cost" mentality and those
who try to keep the institution on the road. We also wish to provide some
guidance and hope for those individuals who respect the rules adopted by
the NCAA membership and the individuals who manage to hold on to the
understanding that college football, after all, is a game played by young
men.
II. WHAT EVERY INSTITUTION WANTS: INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL

Member institutions within the NCAA strive to maintain what is called
"institutional control." 8 Although there have been a few prominent
exceptions, a university is generally able to avoid major sanctions if the
institution is judged to have maintained institutional control of its staff,
student-athletes, boosters, and other individuals who swirl around the
program. Furthermore, under the NCAA rule book, a member's chief
executive officer (CEO) is assigned the ultimate responsibility and final
authority for the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program. 9 Thus,
when notice of an investigation and possible major rules infractions
arrives, university presidents will 'often cut to the chase, and focus great
attention on whether the institution will be able to argue that "institutional
control" was in place. An allegation of lack of institutional control by the

8. NCAA CONST. art. 6.01.1, reprinted inNATIONALCOLLEG1ATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
2002-03 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 49 (2002) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] ("Institutional
Control. The control and responsibility for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised
by the institution itself and by the conference(s), if any, of which it is a member. Administrative
control or faculty control, or a combination of the two, shall constitute institutional control.").
9. Id. at 49; see also NCAA CONST. art. 6.1.1 reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8,

at 49 ("Chief Executive Offcer. A member institution's chief executive officer has ultimate
responsibility and final authority for the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics program and the
actions of any board in control of that program.").

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/2
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NCAA enforcement staff and a corresponding finding by the NCAA
Committee on Infractions is perceived by many to be the most damning of
findings because it represents a failure within the institution, rather than an
act-although major and important-which may have been committed by
a distant booster, renegade coach, or some other variety of "independent
contractor" who has little or no connection to the program.
Under the NCAA rules, an institution is responsible for the conduct of
its staff members,' 0 agencies or organizations promoting the institution's
intercollegiate athletic program," and individuals who fall within the
definition of "representatives of athletics interests."' 12 In street terms,

"representatives of athletics interests" are often simply called "boosters."
Thus, although it is clear that NCAA members are responsible for the acts

of individuals in the same way that businesses may be responsible for the
acts of individuals under respondeat superior, a finding of "lack of
institutional control" sometimes suggests a climate of noncompliance or
a lackadaisical approach to NCAA rules compliance-akin to a climate
within a corporation where there was contempt for rules, negligent
rules, or ignorance of rules due to a failure in rules
disregard of
3
education.'

10. NCAA CONST. art. 2.1.2, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 3.
11. NCAA CONST. art. 6.4.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 5.
12. See NCAA CONST. art. 6.4.2, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 51.
13. The NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions has provided some guidance on how
"institutional control" is defined:
In determining whether there has been a lack of institutional control when a
violation of NCAA rules has been found it is necessary to ascertain what formal
institutional policies and procedures were in place at the time the violation of
NCAA rules occurred and whether those policies and procedures, if adequate,
were being monitored and enforced. It is important that policies and procedures
be established so as to deter violations and not merely to discover their existence
after they have taken place. In a case where proper procedures exist and are
appropriately enforced, especially when they result in the prompt detection,
investigation and reporting of the violations in question, there may be no lack of
institutional control although the individual or individuals directly involved may
be held responsible.
In a situation in which adequate institutional procedures exist, at least on
paper, a practical, common-sense approach is appropriate in determining whether
they are adequately monitored and enforced by a person in "control." Obviously,
general institutional control is exercised by the chief executive officer of a member
institution. However, it is rare that the chief executive officer will make decisions
specifically affecting the operations of the institution's athletics program. Instead,
the day-to-day duties of operation, including compliance with NCAA rules, will
have been delegated to subordinates either by specific action or by the creation of
appropriate job descriptions. Moreover, it is usually left to senior subordinates,
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There are many truisms and other "isms" among those who have

such as the director of athletics, further to delegate various duties regarding
compliance with NCAA rules.
In most institutions, especially those with large and varied athletics programs,
such delegations are made to anumber of individuals who are expected to exercise
control over compliance with regard to specific aspects of the program. The
specific obligations of such individuals should be in writing, and not merely an
understanding among the senior officials of the university and the athletics
department. Not only the director of athletics, but other officials in the athletics
department, the faculty athletics representative, the head coaches and the other
institutional administrators outside of the athletics department responsible for such
matters as the certification of athletes for financial aid, practice and competition,
are expected to assume a primary role in ensuring compliance. Even though
specific action has been taken to place responsibility elsewhere, these individuals
will be assumed to be operating on behalf of the institution with respect to those
responsibilities that are logically within the scope of their positions. Their failure
to control those matters so as to prevent violations of NCAA rules will be
considered the result of a lack of institutional control.
Principlesof InstitutionalControlAs Preparedby the NCAA Division! Committee on Infractions,
1996-97 NCAA GUIDE To RULES COMPLIANCE (on file with authors).
That same document, prepared by the Committee on Infractions, provides that the following
acts are likely to demonstrate a lack of institutional control:
a. A person with compliance responsibilities fails to establish aproper system for
compliance or fails to monitor the operations of a compliance system
appropriately.
b. A person with compliance responsibilities does not take steps to alter the
system of compliance when there are indications the system is not working.
c. A supervisor with overall responsibility for compliance, in assigning duties to
subordinates, so divides responsibilities that, as a practical matter, no one is,
or appears to be, directly in charge.
d. Compliance duties are assigned to a subordinate who lacks sufficient authority
to have the confidence or respect of others.
e. The institution fails to make clear, by its words and its actions, that those
personnel who willfully violate NCAA rules, or who are grossly negligent in
applying those rules, will be disciplined and made subject to discharge.
f. The institution fails to make clear that any individual involved in its
intercollegiate athletics program has a duty to report any perceived violations
of NCAA rules and can do so without fear of reprisals of any kind.
g. A director of athletics or any other individual with compliance responsibilities
fails to investigate or direct an investigation of a possible significant violation
of NCAA rules or fails to report a violation properly.
h. A head coach fails to create and maintain an atmosphere for compliance
within the program the coach supervises or fails to monitor the activities of
assistant coaches regarding compliance.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/2
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digested the NCAA rule book and know the terminology. One concept that
is commonly tossed around is that the maintenance of institutional control
is a "shared responsibility" or a "campus-wide responsibility," which is
certainly true. Athletics directors, coaches, faculty athletics representatives
(FAR), senior woman administrators, student-athletes, and others all have
a responsibility in this area. The reality is that no university CEO can
possibly control a major athletics program on his or her own. At the same
time, there is no question that when an institution comes before the
Committee on Infractions, the president is at the wheel, feels the heat, and
will almost certainly be held accountable by the governing board and folks
back home if the wheels come off in an infractions case. Many people in
academe feel that the relatively short tenure of university presidents is
explained in many cases by the failure to turn around a losing football
program or the imposition of major, crippling sanctions in an NCAA
infractions case. 4 And although the authors of this Article have undertaken
no research or looked for the research of others to support this notion, there
is no question that university presidents, among themselves, clearly
understand the high-stakes poker (career-related) surrounding the outcome
of a major infractions case.5
I. BRIEF COMMENTS ON THE INFRACTIONS PROCESS
It is not difficult to find guidance on the mechanics of the NCAA
infractions process. We will not add much here. Individuals who work in
NCAA rules compliance, either at the NCAA, among the institutions, or
in law firms that assist institutions going through the process, are familiar
with the operation of Article 19 (Enforcement) 16 and Article 32

14. The writings of university presidents underscore the sensitivity of the handling of
important issues in the athletics program. See, e.g., JAMES DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY-A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT'S PERSPECTIVE 55 (2000):

The presidency of a major university is one of those rare leadership roles in which
anything good that happens is generally attributable to someone else, but anything
bad that happens is the president's fault. Or so students, faculty, trustees, and the
media like to suggest. And particularly so in intercollegiate athletics.

15. A past-president of a major Division I public institution, who was involved in numerous
NCAA initiatives and a major infractions case against his institution, expressed the view to one of
the authors that ninety percent of his colleagues who served as chief executives at major footballplaying institutions were replaced or retired after problems involving athletics. Those problems
included the inability to turn around losing programs or the perceived mishandling of a major
infractions case in football or men's basketball.
16. NCAA CONST. art. 19, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 311.
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(Enforcement Policies and Procedures)" of the NCAA Manual. In
addition, the NCAA web site includes a fairly detailed explanation of the
enforcement process, and is updated from time to time by the NCAA
Staff.'" A former Chairman of the Committee on Infractions, the late
Charles Alan Wright, wrote an essay in 1984 that provides great insight
into the handling of infractions cases. 9 Although there have been some
changes made in the process since Professor Wright published the piece,
his essay ought to be required reading for any university president who
receives notice of an inquiry about to be undertaken by the NCAA
enforcement staff. And from time to time, present and former members of
the Committee on Infractions or the NCAA enforcement staff will
participate on panels and make presentations at NCAA regional
compliance seminars, conference compliance seminars, and other venues
in the attempt to remove some of the mystery and confusion surrounding
the NCAA infractions process.2"

Should news of an NCAA violation find its way to the press, one of the
first challenges is to get people calmed down. Although vandalizing a
gumball machine and committing murder are both criminal acts, the public
knows the difference and weighs each accordingly. Not so with NCAA
violations. Any NCAA allegation or violation is viewed by many members
of the public as being grave and certain to lead to great trouble. There is a
visceral, gloom-and-doom reaction to NCAA violations. This, of course,
is wrong, because most NCAA violations fall within the category of
"secondary violations" and will not lead to major trouble. A secondary
violation is one that is "isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is
intended to provide only a minimal recruiting, competitive or other
advantage and does not include any significant recruiting inducement or

17. NCAA CONST. art. 32, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 413. Articles 19
and 32 overlap to a great degree. For example, the composition of the Committee on Infractions is
described in Article 19, but the procedures of hearings before the Committee on Infractions are
described in Article 32. Any individual involved in handling a major infractions case will need to
have their hand in both places as they work through the process.
18. See Frequently Asked Questions about the Enforcement Process, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/faqenforcement.html.
19. Charles Alan Wright, Responding To an NCAA Investigation, Or, What To Do When an
Official Inquiry Comes, I ENTM'T& SPORTS L.J. 19 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Gene A. Marsh, Gaining a Better Understanding of the NCAA and the
Infractions Process, Address at the Alabama Young Lawyers Seminar (May 2002) (providing an
overview of the job of the NCAA enforcement staff, the Committee on Infractions, the Infractions
Appeals Committee, and other entities inside the NCAA); David Didion, Recognizing, Investigating
and Reporting Rules Violations, Address at the 2002 NCAA Regional Compliance Seminar (May
2002) (providing a roadmap for the investigation and reporting of rules violations, with the
pertinent Bylaws cited throughout). Mr. Didion is one of the four Directors of Enforcement with
the NCAA enforcement staff

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/2
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extra benefit.",21 Most large institutions self-report ten or more secondary
violations a year, and most do not become public knowledge.
Conversely, a major violation of NCAA rules constitutes a real threat
and will start the wheels turning in an infractions case, usually leading to
a Letter of Official Inquiry and ultimately an appearance before the
Committee on Infractions.22 But the media and the public will lump all
violations together as very serious, at least at the outset, because for most
reporters, "truth is what they know by deadline. 2 3 The institution should
be ready to have a tutorial on secondary and major infractions, if it is
certain that only secondary violations are in play. If there is even a chance
that what initially looks secondary will develop into a major infractions
case, the institution should not build false hope with public predictions.
Whether the question is the characterization of a violation as major or
secondary, or some other issue, all members of the university team should
avoid predicting outcomes, publicly and probably internally, except in the
smallest of circles. Internal predictions tend to become public in short
order because of the intense public scrutiny and prying eyes of the media,
where there is great pressure on reporters to get the edge. Some members
of the athletics department may leak information that appears to be
favorable to the school or to themselves if the story of the inquiry is
starting to have an impact on recruiting or if staff members are at odds with
each other. In the early stages of an NCAA infractions case, when the
media is in a frenzy, promises of "off-the-record" discussions usually
should be viewed as in the same category as a promise that "the check is
in the mail" or "I'll respect you in the morning." There is not much chance
of a juicy tidbit staying off the record, and because most editors will insist
that a reporter indicate the strength of the source, promises of
confidentiality-even if made by the reporter-may be overridden at a
higher level.
Another reason that predicting outcomes is dangerous is that the
dynamic the institution may feel it has with the enforcement staff may
change due to a change in personnel at the NCAA, discovery of additional
facts, or the testimony of an individual who comes forward at the eleventh
hour of an investigation. The turnover among investigators in the
enforcement staff has been quite high, due in part to the move from Kansas
City to Indianapolis, but also due to career changes when institutions or
law firms hire people away from the NCAA. NCAA staff members often

21. NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 311-12.
22. A major violation is defined as: "All violations other than secondary violations are major
violations, specifically including those that provide an extensive recruiting or competitive
advantage." NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 312.
23. David J. Levy et al., Have a Media Plan Before Crisis Strikes, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 12,2002,
at C13.
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move on to become compliance directors on campus. In recent years, a
number of cases have passed through the hands of several NCAA staff
members before the case is finally presented to the Committee on
Infractions at a hearing. Many cases that were thought to be "in-the-can"
become far more complex and serious when a key player in an
investigation decides to come clean and be interviewed by the NCAA or
the institution. Sometimes individuals who are granted limited immunity
come forward at the eleventh hour, changing the nature of the case. 4 So,
individuals affiliated with the school who gave the "all clear" signal
publicly, may be forced to eat their words, and the public in this area is
notoriously unforgiving in focusing on rosy predictions previously given.
Although the institution should not discuss specifics of any allegations
while the investigation is ongoing, the institution should be generous in
explaining the NCAA infractions process, to clear up the confusion on
such matters as whether NCAA representatives have conducted interviews
on campus (if the information is walking around, which is likely), and
which members of the campus community or outside entities have been
selected by the CEO to handle the investigation. It is a mistake to deny the
existence of an NCAA inquiry when the local hotel manager has already
phoned reporters, alerting them to the fact that NCAA investigators have
checked in. The use of an NCAA American Express card when checking
in to hotels or paying for meals, or flashing NCAA credentials or airline
ticket jackets marked with the NCAA logo does not go unnoticed. "Elvis
is in the building" at that point.
Virtually all of the "players" at an institution, including presidents,
ADs, compliance directors, FARs, coaches, and student-athletes should be
given some guidance on dealing with the press and public in these cases.

24. See NCAA Bylaw 32.3.7, reprinted in NCAA

MANUAL,

supra note 8, at 416, providing

that:
At the request of the enforcement staff, the committee may grant limited immunity
to a student-athlete who provides information when such individual otherwise
might be declared ineligible for intercollegiate competition based on the
information that he or she reports and an institutional employee with
responsibilities related to athletics when such an individual otherwise would be
subject to disciplinary action as described in Bylaws 19.6.1 -(c) and 19.6.2.2-(l)
based upon the information that individual reports. Such immunity shall not apply
to the individual's involvement in violations of NCAA regulations not reported

or to future involvement in violations of NCAA legislation by the individual. In
any case, such immunity shall not be granted unless the individual voluntarily

provides information not otherwise available to the enforcement staff when no
previous information has been developed that would jeopardize the individual.
The granting of limited immunity does not exempt an individual from any action
that an institution imposes.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/2
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One should not assume that a university relations veteran or spokesperson
will understand the workings and techniques of the sports press. University
relations people need to be holding hands with sports information directors
and all the key participants in the university's investigation and response
team. A veteran sports information director who has a good relationship
with the press will be extremely valuable at this stage of the game.
The NCAA itself will not jump in and clear up the confusion because
the NCAA will not comment on investigations." When it comes to
infractions and the enforcement process, the NCAA is notorious for having
"4no comment" as its only comment. This tight-lipped approach is used to
avoid compromising ongoing investigations and because of the sensitive
nature of some of the issues in an infractions case, such as academic fraud.
The no-comment approach also serves to add to the mystery and intrigue
of what might, in truth, be a relatively minor and simple case. An insider
may leak an incorrect version of the story to the press, which will gain
currency by repetition if it is the only story walking around.
Another area of common misunderstanding is that what fans believe is
one entity (the NCAA) is in fact several distinct units. Having good karma
with one unit may not have any impact on another. Simply put, people
usually do not understand that the NCAA enforcement staff is an entirely
separate enterprise from the Committee on Infractions. In the end, it is the
Committee on Infractions that holds all the cards (unless there is an
appeal), and no matter how great the cooperative spirit and harmony
between the enforcement staff and the institution, the Committee on
Infractions is the thousand pound gorilla, with the final word in the case.26
Many a school makes the mistake of publicly describing the great working
relationship with the enforcement staff as portending a positive outcome
in the case. There is no question that cooperation in the investigation is an
obligation of membership and should be weighed in determining and

25. See NCAA Bylaw 32.1.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 413, providing
that:
The enforcement staff shall not confirm or deny the existence of an infractions

case prior to complete resolution of the case through normal NCAA enforcement
procedures. However, if the involved institution makes a public announcement
concerning a case, the enforcement staffmay confirm the information made public
by the institution and may correct erroneous or incomplete information about the

investigation that has been made public by the institution.
26. The Committee on Infractions not only is often the final word, but it also establishes
investigative guidelines in the infractions process. See NCAA Bylaw 19.1.3(b), reprinted in NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 8, at 313.
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imposing penalties. 2" The institution should, however, be entirely guarded
and educate the public on the different roles played by the enforcement
staff and the Committee on Infractions.
There is also the potential for confusion when another NCAA entity
enters the picture. An example might be when an institution uses the
interpretations process during the course of an investigation regarding the
application of NCAA legislation. The current interpretations process is set
forth in the NCAA Constitution, Article 5.4.1.2.28 An institution may
receive an interpretation of the application of NCAA legislation to a set of
facts and may request a review of NCAA staff interpretations to the
respective divisional management councils.29 It would appear from a close
reading of the NCAA legislation that the Committee on Infractions and the
NCAA Division I Infractions Appeals Committee also have some quasiinterpretative authority in the determination of whether a particular set of
facts constitutes a violation of NCAA legislation. Bylaw 19.1.3-(c)
provides that the Committee on Infractions has the duty to "[d]etermine
facts related to alleged violations andfind violations of NCAA rules and
requirements.,30 Bylaw 32.10.2 provides that the Infractions Appeals
Committee may set aside "[d]eterminations of fact and violations arrived
at by the Committee on Infractions."'" There may be a circumstance where
an interpretation received by an institution will get a second look in the
infractions process, providing one more possibility for a change in the
predicted outcome of a case.
Even with the resources and help available, getting pulled into an
infractions case is not your everyday event, and it is a unique process,
unlike the experience one gains in civil litigation, criminal matters, or
practice before an administrative agency. A Committee on Infractions
hearing feels a little like a trial, a little like a hearing before an
administrative agency, and a little like an academic or non-academic
misconduct hearing on a campus because it has all of those elements and
more. In some cases there are no facts in dispute, no current or former
employees at risk, and very little to discuss beyond the penalties. Other
cases may be contentious and complicated, with several parties (and
27. See Richard R. Hilliard et al., An Update on Recent Decisions Rendered by the NCAA
InfractionsAppeals Committee: Further GuidelinesforNCAA Member Institutions,28 J.C. & U.L.
605, 609 (2002) (noting that there are different levels or degrees of cooperation, and that a CEO

who requires his or her institution to open itself to the enforcement process may face powerful
opposition).
28. NCAA
29. NCAA
30. NCAA
added).
31. NCAA

MANUAL, supra note 8, at 43.
CONST. art. 5.4.1.2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 43.
Bylaw 19.1.3-(c), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 313 (emphasis
Bylaw 32.10.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 423 (emphasis

added).
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lawyers) who are at odds with each other or the institution, and involve
actual or threatened lawsuits that may be proceeding down a parallel path,
separate from the rules violations at the heart of the NCAA Committee on
Infractions hearing. The resolution of the NCAA case may have an impact
on the sidebar litigation.
In some cases, the university's presentation reflects the peace, harmony,
and unity of the television series The Walton 's, while others describe their
experience as more closely resembling MTV's The Osbournes.As is true
in civil or criminal trials, the chemistry of any particular Committee on
Infractions hearing may not be reflected in the stark, printed record. It is
also dangerous to predict outcomes because the dynamic of a case at the
start of the hearing may change dramatically during the day (for better or
worse), with a new issue surfacing, based on new information developed
at the hearing in response to questions. All members of the university team
should be familiar with the record and the institution's written response.
Any institutional representative may be questioned onjob-related matters.
Typically, only one or two individuals will carry the load for the institution
in responding to questions or articulating the university's position on an
allegation, but all members of the team should be briefed on matters that
may result in questions from the Committee on Infractions. No one should
expect that only the lawyers will be asked to respond to questions.
Lawyers who are representing a client (individual or institution) often
make the mistake of assuming that all components and strategies in civil
or criminal litigation are transferable to an NCAA infractions process and
hearing. Some are. Some are not.32 A lawyer who is new to the process will
be tempted to treat the case like a civil trial, with opening statements
designed to "educate the jury" (in this case, the Committee on Infractions)
on what the case is all about, hoping they will adopt a theme of the case,
and providing closing statements that re-teach and repeat all that has been
said. This is a mistake.
Being on the Committee on Infractions is like being on jury duty in
perpetuity. The Committee on Infractions is almost entirely familiar with
the "game" of college athletics, recruiting rules, extra benefit legislation,
and so on because of the jobs they hold throughout the week. Emotional
arguments designed to tear at the heart of ajury do not land on people who
have studied the record in many cases and have some responsibility for
enforcement of rules when they return to their campuses. Remember that
this enforcement process was created by member institutions, for
representatives of the membership to sit in judgment of each other. Here,

32. See John Kitchin, The NCAA and Due Process, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1996)

(noting that the NCAA infractions process is neither a criminal prosecution nor an adversary
proceeding in the usual sense of the term; rather, the primary issue is whether a member, a
member's employee, or a student-athlete violated a rule).
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decisionmakers do not get pulled in like people on jury duty. Some of the
frustrations expressed by lawyers who deal with federal and state
regulatory agencies apply here as well, but the member schools have
shown no inclination to dump the current model. Part of the reason is that
relatively few schools have run afoul of the system in a way that would
cause them to change the system, and the schools that have gone through
the system are too exhausted by it to devote much energy to reform.
Boosters and fans are not players in the system any more than the average
Joe on the street is a player in a civil or criminal trial, just because he
happens to have an opinion on the temperature of McDonald's coffee or
the guilt of a celebrity accused of a crime.
Effective representation ofan institution or individual in the infractions
process also requires fortitude and discipline that can withstand intense
scrutiny from thousands of purported experts. Pay a monthly subscriber
fee, adopt a chat line name like "Howling Dog," and suddenly you are an
anonymous internet expert on the NCAA infractions process. Having a
telephone, a radio, a toll free number, and a pulse qualifies you to be a
regular commentator on a talk radio show.
No matter how many trials a lawyer has handled, he or she probably
never has had a case where people will stay up 24 hours a day on the
internet, weighing in on your strategy, or hang on the line 30 minutes just
to hear their voice on talk radio. So if you are a lawyer handling one of
these cases or a representative of the institution in the process, arm yourself
with thick skin, a strong sense of humor, and an appreciation for the
process being one that is unlike any case you have tried or settled. To the
extent that great lawyering requires the ability to adapt to a new
environment and set of rules, be prepared to work in a setting and with a
rule book that is like no other. It is not a perfect system, but no one has
come up with a better model. As long as the schools do not trust each other
to self-police, the Committee on Infractions will be in business.
One of the most common complaints about the NCAA enforcement
process, usually asserted by coaches who have been under scrutiny in a
major infractions case, is that the enforcement procedures do not comport
with procedural due process. Much has been written on the issue of the
NCAA enforcement mechanism and due process.3 ' There are several
prominent appellate opinions dealing with the NCAA and due process.34

33. See, e.g., id.(concluding that the NCAA enforcement procedures provide more protection
for members, student-athletes, coaches, and administrators than some critics believe, and that the

NCAA membership maintains that its procedures meet the standards of fairness prescribed within
the concept of "due process," even though such standards may not legally be required).
34. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (NCAA participation in events which
led to suspension of a basketball coach by a state university did not constitute state action or action
under color of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d
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In the 1990s, "a number of state legislatures [either] considered or enacted
legislation which purports to provide state educational institutions,
employees, student-athletes, and boosters with specified procedural
protections during NCAA proceedings."" However, after several adverse
court decisions, most such legislation has been abandoned and no effort
has been made to use the state laws which might still exist to challenge the
NCAA procedure.36

Outside of issues relating to due process, the NCAA enforcement
process attracts honest and dishonest critics, for all the obvious reasons.
Coaches whose programs come under scrutiny or who are personally
sanctioned in the system sometimes write books, become talk-show
"experts" on the NCAA process, and often spend the rest of their
professional career unloading on the NCAA, without disclosing how they
became so resolute. Self-disclosure of previous involvement in infractions
rarely occurs. But not all of the criticism comes from guilty (or nearly
guilty) parties. For example, Tom McMillen, whose credentials include a
Rhodes Scholarship, eleven years in the NBA, and service in the U.S.
House of Representatives, has been involved in many ventures aimed at
time, he is a bitter critic of
major reform of college athletics. At the 3same
7
the NCAA and the enforcement process.
352, 371 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that "factfindings ascertained in procedures [of the NCAAJ which
unquestionably afforded due process reflected conduct reasonably understood as proscribed and
reasonably understood as mandating ineligibility").
35. Kitchin, supra note 32, at 76.
36. Id at 78.
37. See TOM MCMILLEN, Our OF BOUNDS: How THE AMERICAN SPORTS ESTABLISHMENT IS
BEING DRIVEN BY GREED AND HYPOCRISY-AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE ABOUT IT 116-17

(1992). Mr. McMillen stated:
The NCAA has acted against the interests of student-athletes in countless
other ways. The enforcement apparatus of the NCAA falls heaviest upon innocent

student-athletes. By the time the NCAA has levied penalties against a
transgressing athletic program, the guilty parties (coaches and players) have
moved on, leaving behind innocent student-athletes to suffer from a ban on
postseason play or TV coverage.
In some cases the delay between the alleged violations and the punishment
is absurdly long. Before backing down at the threat of a legal challenge, the
NCAA had banned the Runnin' Rebels of UNLV from defending their national
championship in the 1991 tourney, based upon alleged violations that dated back
thirteen years. In other words, the NCAA was prepared to punish college athletes
for alleged transgressions that occurred when they were barely starting grade
school.
Likewise, in 1990 when the NCAA slapped my alma mater, Maryland, with
a slew of penalties, including a three-year probationary period, a two-year ban on
NCAA tournament play, and a one-year TV blackout, the offending coach and
players had skipped, and anew coach and innocent players are now paying for the
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Without regard to the critics, the NCAA enforcement process has
moved forward, satisfying some and infuriating others. For many people,
happiness is the news that an NCAA enforcement representative is visiting
another campus, most especially, a competitor. But when a major
investigation lands at home, it is The Perfect Storm. As the impact of
multimillion dollar television contracts and salaries further infect the
system, it is not likely that the frequency of cases will diminish. Although
some conferences, such as the PAC- 10, have maintained their own
conference infractions committee, most of the conference commissioners
and presidents have decided to let the NCAA do it, avoiding some of the
bitter aftertaste that lingers when one conference school is involved in
imposing sanctions on a sister institution. Involving the conference office
heavily in the infractions process has its ups and downs.38 Although it is

sins of their predecessors.
The restrictions governing the transfer of a student-athlete further
demonstrate the injustice of the present system. A college student who transfers
to a new institution is barred by the NCAA from participating in intercollegiate
athletics at his new school for a full academic year regardless of the reason for his
transfer. The rule is designed to prevent raiding and preserve the facade of
amateurism.
Of course, there are many justifiable reasons for a student to transfer that
have nothing to do with raiding or improper inducements. He may not like his
coach or the locale of his school. His academic interests may change, and he may
feel that another school is more suited to a new major. For personal reasons he
may need to move closer to home.
Rather than enact sensible rules against raiding, the NCAA forces a player
to sit tight at a school where he may be miserable or to sit out a year. But a coach
under fire can bolt from a beleaguered institution and immediately jump into
another college program.
The NCAA is preoccupied with keeping the contests competitive for the TV
audiences, even at the expense of the best interests of the students. But the NCAA
should err on the side of greater freedom for the students to transfer rather than
protecting its package for the networks.
The NCAA's dereliction of duty toward student-athletes is evident in the
provision limiting athletic scholarships to a maximum period of one year,
renewable at the option of the school. This rule gives the athletic department
tremendous leverage over its players. The decision by a coach not to renew a
scholarship reflects an earlier miscalculation by the coach and the player. Why
should the player bear the greater risk? If the NCAA were truly concerned with
the students, athletic scholarships would be for a minimum period of five years,
cancellable on athletic grounds only ifthe recruit does not participate in the sport,
as the Knight Commission has recommended.
Id. (footnote omitted).
38. See generally WALTER BYERs, UNSPORTSMANLIKECONDUCT (1995) (providing a history
of the development and financial growth of intercollegiate athletics, with recommendations for
restoration of basic freedoms for players and equitable treatment for competing teams). Byers

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/2

16

Marsh and Robbins: Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership and Ins
WEIGHING THE INTERES7S INAN NC 4 INVESI7GATION

laudable to have a serious self-policing effort in the conference, a
conference investigation and infractions proceeding will be separate from
the Committee on Infractions process, sometimes leading to multiple
interviews as the institution, conference, and finally the NCAA
enforcement staff get involved.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AN NCAA INVESTIGATION
Institutions often rely heavily on in-house counsel and outside law
firms in NCAA compliance work and in the handling of a major infractions
case. Lawyers who approach an NCAA infractions case often come at it
with the perspective they bring to civil or.criminal litigation, which may or
may not be consistent with how institutional staff members, such as
compliance directors and FARs, approach an NCAA investigation.
Oversimplification here is a disservice to all the parties who get pulled into
an NCAA investigation. All the parties certainly share at least one thing in
common-they would rather be doing something else than being at the
wrong end of an NCAA enforcement proceeding. But these potential
differences in approach by all parties who address the problem in good
faith are worth examining. They will be treated in Part VII below.
Another consideration an institution should assess when facing a major
infractions case is whether the institution's in-house counsel infiastructure
can handle the volume of information that will be amassed and the
compilation ofthat information into the university's response to an official
inquiry. Outside attorneys and their law firms (depending on the resources
of the firm) can provide services and resources that most university inhouse counsel offices cannot. The technological wave that has hit legal
practice has not yet reached many university counsel offices, due to a lack
of resources. For example, outside counsel can provide a secure, central
computerized mechanism by which documents and transcripts of
served as Executive Director of the NCAA. Regarding the role of the conference office in the
enforcement process, Byers stated:
By the 1960s, most conference commissioners had decided to let the NCAA
do it. One or two continued to believe their conference members wanted strong
enforcement at the conference level. They decided to pursue separate and
independent investigations of violations, regardless of what the NCAA decided to
do.
By then we were walking a political tightrope, determined to maintain the
integrity of NCAA enforcement. While we worked with some conference
commissioners, it was necessary to avoid others--those who we believed would
feed confidential information to their conference members in the hope of winning
friends and thwarting the NCAA inquiry.
Id. at 123 (emphasis in original).
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interviews, among other things, can be viewed by those involved with the
case no matter where they are located. Outside counsel can also provide
invaluable services as the response to the official inquiry is drafted, edited,
and finalized. Moreover, a law firm of greater size and resources than the
university's counsel office can assemble and produce the necessary number
of copies of the response in a more efficient manner. Ultimately, all of
these services can pare months offofthe length of an infractions case when
the university's counsel office cannot devote the necessary staffing and
resources to a major infractions case.
One clear advantage of having an attorney on point in an investigation
is the protection that the attorney-client privilege may provide for the
institution. The origin ofthe attorney-client privilege is uncertain. The first
English case to mention the privilege was Berd v. Lovelace. 9 Scholarly
authorities disagree on the point in time that the privilege became a wellsettled facet of English law. A large portion of this uncertainty is due to the
fact that the courts of equity developed the privilege earlier than the courts
of law.40 At first, the privilege was viewed as an outgrowth of the lawyer's
honor as a gentleman,4' and a lawyer's unauthorized revelation ofa client's
confidences would, in the words of the time, "shock... every feeling of
justice, honour, and humanity. 4 2 By the late eighteenth century, courts
began to shed the notion that the privilege was a facet of honor, noting that
its practical purpose was to encourage clients to speak to their attorneys
freely.43 Scholars do agree that by the nineteenth century, the existence of
the privilege and its scope were firmly established."
In the United States, an important early development was the erosion
of the "litigation limitation" on the privilege. This limitation was imported
to America by dicta in Dixon v. Parmelee,4" in which a Vermont court
refused to extend the privilege past information that was "strictly confined
to the period in which the suit has been pending, and to the party of record,
or in interest; and where the substance ofthe communication was such that
it became necessary for the attorney to know it in order to manage the
suit."46 This limitation was soon wiped out by other courts. By 1881, courts
were recognizing that the privilege extended "to communications in
reference to all matters which are the proper subject of professional

39. 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (ch. 1577).
40. EDWARD J.IMWINKELRIED, THENEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.2 (2002).
41. Id. (quoting J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
42. Id. § 2.3 (quoting I LIVINGSTON, WORKS 461 (1873)).

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 2.4.
Id.
2 Vt. 185 (1829).
Id. at 186.
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47

employment.
The common law rules of the privilege have been codified in many
places. 48 Generally, communications made by a client to his attorney for
the purpose of seeking professional advice, as well as the responses by the
attorney to such inquiries, are privileged communications not subject to
disclosure. 49 This protection is only available if it has not been explicitly
or implicitly waived by the client. 50 The attorney-client privilege is
available only after a series of requirements is satisfied:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.5 '
The above requirements are simplified somewhat in Alabama. The party
asserting the attorney-client privilege must establish only (1) the presence
of an attorney-client relationship, (2) the facts demonstrating the
communications were within the privilege, and (3) the prejudicial effect to
the client that would result from any disclosure of the privileged
information.52
53
The attorney-client privilege may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Express waivers are not common; usually waivers are implied after a client
fails to take reasonable precautions to preserve the confidentiality of the
attorney-client communications. The general rule is that the privilege is

47. Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 72, 76 (1881).
48. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (McKinney 1992); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4062(2) (West 1996); CAL. EviD. CODE § 954 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90107(l)(b) (West 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(2) (Michie 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West
1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 45N (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-803 (1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-20 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2502 (West 1996); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 9, Rule 1.05 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-24-8(2) (1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(2)(a) (West 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 112-101 (Michie 1996).
49. United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996); Meriwether v. LexingtonFayette Urban County Gov't, No. 2000-CA-002050-MR, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 1, at *1 (Jan. 4,
2002).
50. ExparteState Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 So. 2d 368,374 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Mortgage
Guar. & Title Co. v. Cunha, 745 A.2d 156, 160 (R.I. 2000)).
51. J.WiGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
52. Swain v. Terry, 454 So. 2d 948, 953 (Ala. 1984).
53. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (bankruptcy
trustee expressly waived privilege to third party); U.S. v. Kingston, 971 F.2d 481, 490 (10th Cir.
1982) (client appeared before grand jury and waived the privilege).
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waived when a party puts an attorney-client communication at issue in a
case.54 More specifically, the privilege has been impliedly waived when
"the actual content of the attorney client communication has been placed
in issue [in such a way] that the information is actually required for the
truthful resolution of the issues raised in the controversy."" One situation
in which a court found the privilege to be waived was when privileged
documents were sent along with ordinary business documents with no
attempt to segregate the two. 56 Another example is that the attorney-client
privilege does not cover statements intended to be made public.57
Related to the attorney-client privilege is whether the privilege can be
used to fend off Open Records requests. The majority of courts hold that
Open Records Laws do not trump the attorney-client privilege.5" Even the
Freedom of Information Act, on which most states' Open Record Laws
were modeled, contains an exemption for documents protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 9 There are exceptions, however. The attorneyclient privilege is often, if not always, statutory. Therefore, state
legislatures could enact an Open Records Law to create an exception to the
privilege.' For example, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
legislature did not intend to exempt documents that are confidential or
privileged only as a result ofthe judicially created attorney-client privilege
when it enacted Florida's Open Records Law.61 For a better understanding
of where the privilege ends and Open Records requests start, a study of the
individual state case law should be undertaken. Institutional representatives
and outside counsel involved in an NCAA investigation should be briefed
on the Open Records Laws of the state so that they are mindful of these
issues when the local or national media submits a request under the law for

54. Exparte State Farm, 794 So. 2d at 374 (quoting Mortgage Guar. & Title Co. v. Cunha,
745 A.2d 156, 160 (R.I. 2000)).
55. Id. at 376 (quoting Mortgage Guar. & Title Co. v. Cunha, 745 A.2d 156, 160 (R.I. 2000)).
56. Advanced Metal, Inc. v. Arden Med. Sys., Inc., 1988 WL 76128, at *5(E.D. Pa. July 18,
1988).
57. Hughes v. Wallace, 429 So. 2d 981, 983 (Ala. 1983).
58. See City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1055 (Colo. 1998) (holding that
the legislature did not intend to supplant the attorney-client privilege when it enacted the open
records laws); Cypress Media v. City of Overland Park, 997 P.2d 681 (Kan. 2000) (holding that
documents protected by the privilege are not subject to disclosure under Open Records Act);
Meriwether, No. 2000-CA-002050-MR, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS I, at * I (holding that the Open
Records Act did not create an exception to the attorney-client privilege); Woodman v. City of
Lakewood, 44 Ohio App. 3d. I 18, 120 (1988) (finding that the Ohio Public Records Law exempted
records subject to the attorney-client privilege).
59. See Lee v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 923 F. Supp. 451, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); White, 967
P.2d at 1055.
60. See Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979).
61. Id. at 424.
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documents related to the inquiry. Institutions should have a plan for the
release of documents and correspondence, much of which may be redacted.
V. THE ROLE OF THE FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVE
ON CAMPUS AND IN RULES COMPLIANCE

Most individuals who follow college athletics have a fairly good idea
of the role played by a university president, AD, and head coach, and most
people can provide a reasonably good description of the duties of an
individual identified as a compliance director. But in thumbing through the
media guide or in general dealings with the campus, they will come upon
an individual who carries the title "Faculty Athletics Representative,"
(FAR) and the most common response will be "huh?"
Under Article 6.1.3 of the NCAA Constitution, the position of FAR is
described as follows:
A member institution shall designate an individual to serve as
faculty athletics representative. An individual so designated
after January 12, 1989, shall be a member of the institution's
faculty or an administrator who holds faculty rank and shall not
hold an administrative or coaching position in the athletics
department. Duties of the faculty athletics representative shall
be determined by the member institution. 62
Note well the language in the last sentence of the job description, because
it captures the reality of the job on many campuses across the NCAA
membership. In many ways, FARs are like snowflakes-no two are alike.
A place to start in trying to understand the possible role of the FAR in
compliance and in an infractions case is the FAR Handbook,63 which is
prepared by the Faculty Athletics Representatives Association (FARA), in
cooperation with the NCAA membership services staff.64 The publication
highlights the history of faculty involvement in the NCAA and the possible
role of the FAR in the NCAA legislative process, NCAA and conference
rules compliance, the enforcement process, athletics certification, and other
areas where faculty input is vital. The authors will not repeat, here what
can be gained by studying the NCAA publication. It is clear from a reading
of the FARA and NCAA literature that were any FAR to try to take on all
the suggested responsibilities, he or she would cease being a faculty
member and become a full-time administrator. But no matter what general
62. NCAA CONST. art. 6.1.3., reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 50.

63.

THE

NATIONAL

COLLEGIATE

ATHLETIC

ASSOCIATION,

FACULTY

ATHLETICS

REPRESENTATIVE HANDBOOK (1998) (distributed to CEOs, directors of athletics, FARs, senior
woman
administrators
and conference
commissioners),
http://www.ncaa.orglibrary/membershiplfar-handbook.pdf.

available

at

64. Id.at 3.
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guidelines are given by the FARA and the NCAA, in the reality of campus
life, it is clear that the responsibility of the FAR varies widely from
campus to campus, even within the same conference. 5 The role ofthe FAR
in conference governance and campus dealings varies even more widely
across conferences. Among the larger conferences, the FARs often meet
several times each year as a roup and are heavily involved in governance
and the legislative process.1 In other conferences, the FARs meet less
frequently as a group, if at all, and tend to rely more on the FARA for
discussion with their peers.
Most institutions now have written job descriptions for the FAR
position. Some of those descriptions are skeletal and may not be amended
to fit the reality of the change in FAR duties over time or a change in the
focus that the current office holder brings, however. FARs are not athletics
department administrators. They work for the CEO of the institution and
represent the interests of the faculty. If a FAR starts to become perceived
as an athletics department administrator, the faculty has lost out. The first
word in the title should serve as a constant reminder of the role-faculty
athletics representative.
FARs generally serve at the pleasure of, and are appointed by the CEO,
sometimes in consultation with the faculty senate or the equivalent body
among the faculty.67 Often there is a change in the FAR
65. For example, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) Commissioners Office surveyed the 12
SEC FARs in the 1998-99 and 2000-01 academic years. The questions asked were as follows:

*
*
*
*
*
*

Please describe the structure of your office (i.e., do you have an
administrative assistant or graduate assistant that helps you in
performing your FAR duties?)
Do you have an assigned office for your responsibilities as FAR?
Are your teaching responsibilities altered as a result of your FAR
responsibilities?
Do you get release time?
How many courses do you teach?
Describe any other arrangements that have been made to accommodate
your schedule/duties as FAR.

The answers provided in both surveys underscore the last sentence in Article 6.1 .3--that the
member institutions will define the role and the arrangement. See Faculty Athletics Representative
Office Structure Survey, 2000-2001 Academic Year (on file with authors).
66. For example, in the SEC, the FARS meet separately at least three times each year and at
the annual conference meeting, sit at the table with presidents, athletics directors, and senior woman
administrators in the formulation of conference legislation and the conference position in the
NCAA legislative process.
67. At The University of Alabama, the FAR is named by the President, in consultation with
the President of the Faculty Senate.
The complete job description is as follows:
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POSITION DESCRIPTION
TITLE
Faculty Athletics Representative (FAR)

APPOINTMENT AND LENGTH OF SERVICE
The FAR shall be named by the President in consultation with the Faculty Senate.
The FAR shall be a member of the faculty and attend to all duties of that office as
specified in manuals of the NCAA, the SEC, and the FARs Association. The term
of office shall be three years and may be renewed once with approval of the
Faculty Senate Steering Committee. Additional years of service may be added if
service on national committees result in a significant benefit to the University. To
facilitate transitions, a FAR designate shall be named in the last year of an
incumbent's term.
GENERAL JOB DESCRIPTION
The FAR will work closely with the President, the faculty, students, the Director
of Athletics, the Senior Woman Administrator, the Associate Athletics Director
for Compliance, and the other athletic department personnel to support a campus
environment in which the athletics program is a vital component of the
educational program and in which student-athletes constitute an integral part of
the student body. The FAR also represents the University and the faculty in the
institution's relationship with the NCAA and the SEC.
SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES
The major responsibilities of the FAR at the University of Alabama are in the
areas of compliance and academic integrity, although success in those areas
requires teamwork and cooperation among a number of individuals on campus.
The FAR shall have the following responsibilities and others as shall be assigned
by the President:
A. Academic Support
I. To review proposed competition schedules in order to monitor studentathlete time demands.
2. To work closely with the Athletics Director, the Senior Woman
Administrator, the Director of Athletic-Academics and the Center for Athletic
Student Services to review and evaluate academic and general support services for
student-athletes.
3. To receive regular reports and to monitor the academic performance of
individual student-athletes and teams, to report these results to the President and
to work constructively and cooperatively with coaches and students in order to
assist student-athletes in their academic pursuits.
4. Working with the Director of Athletic-Academics, faculty and coaches,
to participate in and further the nomination process for all academic awards and
scholarships available through the SEC, the NCAA and other organizations.
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position when there is a change in the position of the CEO.
But without regard to who holds the FAR position, no one individual
faculty member should become the dominant "go to" person in

5. To participate in exit interviews with student-athletes.
6. To address faculty concerns regarding the practice and competition
schedules for athletes and to maintain the communication between the faculty and
the Athletics Department.
B. Compliance
1.To keep the President informed of all matters and incidents involving
compliance, in consultation with the Compliance Director.
2. To serve as a member of the University Athletic Compliance
Committee.
3. To participate in the investigation and reporting of possible violations
of NCAA, SEC and institutional policies and rules, as outlined in the institutional
document on such procedures, dated April 1997.
4. To work as part of a team and meet those responsibilities as outlined in
the document UA Proceduresfor Certifying Student-Athlete Eligibility (1997).

5.To attend compliance education meetings conducted by the Associate
Athletics Director for Compliance.
6. To work cooperatively with and support the work of the Associate
Athletics Director for Compliance. To work as a part of the team in the
development of appeals, reports and other correspondence to the NCAA and the
SEC, as outlined in the NCAA Manual and SEC Manual and Commissioner's
Regulations.

C. Other Responsibilities
I.To serve as Chair of the Intercollegiate Athletics Committee.
2. To represent the institution as a delegate to NCAA conventions and
SEC meetings. To work cooperatively with the President, Athletics Director, the
Senior Woman Administrator, the Associate Athletics Director for Compliance,
the faculty and others in developing the institution's position on proposals at the
NCAA Convention and the annual meeting of the SEC.
3. To report to the Faculty Senate on matters relating to student-athletes
and to solicit the advice of colleagues on matters relating to student-athletes and
the role of the athletics programs on campus.
COMPENSATION AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
The level of compensation is negotiable between the FAR and President.
Consultation with the appropriate academic dean is encouraged. Compensation
may be in the form of release time and/or an appropriate stipend.
Appropriate financial support shall be made available through the Office ofthe
President or the Provost to enable the FAR to have adequate secretarial services,
travel to NCAA, SEC and other related meetings, and to cover long distance
telephone expenses.
University of Alabama, Position Description, Faculty Athletics Representative (Aug. 2002) (on file
with authors).
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representing the interests of the faculty, chairing committees, or serving as
the faculty spokesperson on matters relating to athletics and the lives of
student-athletes. Faculty members campus-wide should have, and should
feel free to have, input on the important issues relating to the lives of
student-athletes and the development of admissions and retention standards
for all students, including student-athletes. At many institutions, the faculty
has been silent for too long on academic integrity issues as they relate to
athletics.6"
Without regard to changes in the CEO position, some campuses have
instituted term limits for the FAR position. There are pluses and minuses
related to this idea. An advantage of term limits is the idea of moving the
position around campus from time to time, so that no one individual or
college holds the position for too long a time. At most institutions, if given
a choice, the faculty would lean toward not having the FAR position stay
in the hands of the same individual over an extended period of time. This
should not be a job that becomes the "property" of any one faculty
member. One disadvantage of a term limit, however, is the loss of
knowledge and experience the individual serving as FAR gains over time.
There is no question that there is a learning curve associated with
becoming familiar with NCAA rules, the legislative process, and all the
other matters that may land at the feet of the FAR. At the same time, an
institution with a term limit can avoid this problem by having a FARdesignate in the last year of the current FAR's term, which would allow the
incoming FAR to attend conference meetings, NCAA rules compliance
seminars, and other gatherings in order to start the job with a working
knowledge of the rules, familiarity with critical campus personnel, and
some understanding of the job's requirements.69

68. See, e.g.,

KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A CALL

(2001), available at
report/call-to-action.pdf.

TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION

http://www.ncaa.org/database/knight.commission200l

Faculty, too, have a critical role to play. Above all, they must defend the
academic values of their institutions. Too few faculty speak out on their campus
or fight aggressively against meaningless courses or degrees specifically designed
to keep athletes eligible, suggesting they have surrendered their role as defenders
of academic integrity in the classroom. Further, the academy has capitulated on its
responsibility and allowed commercial interests--television, shoe companies,
corporate sponsors of all sorts-to dictate the terms under which college sports
operate. No academic institution would allow television to arrange its class
schedule; neither should television control college athletic schedules. There are
scattered signs of faculty awakening, but on many campuses, faculty indifference
prevails even when informed critics make their case.
Id. at 25.
69. For example, the FAR position at The University of Alabama is limited to a three-year
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It is not uncommon to find FARs who have held the job for twenty
years. They may bring significant knowledge to the position, which they
have accumulated over many years, but there is no reason why other
capable faculty members on campus could not serve just as effectively and
bring some new ideas and perspectives to the position. Service on most
NCAA governing bodies, NCAA committees, and many athletic
conference committees is defined by term limits. There is no compelling
reason why the FAR position on campus should be treated any differently,
becoming the property of any one individual or college on campus. Having
a term limit may help faculty members stay focused on their future as a
faculty member separate from the FAR position, avoiding the trap of
growing stale in their academic discipline. Some FARs have been at it so
long that people on campus no longer associate them with "faculty," and
do not know whether the individual is a poet or a potter. Again, the focus
should be on the individual as faculty member first, and "other" becoming
dominant only infrequently. But, there is no question that this is an area
where the individual institution and the FAR can feel their way along,
based on the demands of the job at the institution and the wishes of the
CEO and faculty.
But no matter what model the institution adopts and no matter how long
an individual holds the FAR position, an essential attribute for the FAR is
independence in representing the position of the faculty and the academic
mission of the institution, which will be achieved only if the institution's
CEO fully appreciates and supports the FAR. A FAR stands off to the side
of the athletics department, accountable to the CEO and the faculty, not the
AD or athletics department. Having tenure in an academic discipline
allows for freedom of thought and expression, which are also essential
qualities in serving in a regulatory role. There is no question that the FAR
is at times in a regulatory position. The CEO of an institution should
appoint an individual to be FAR who is a watchdog, not a lapdog. An
effective FAR will maintain a relationship with people in the athletics
department, but will not become captured by the system. The recent
corporate scandals on Wall Street have highlighted the troubles that follow
when regulators aim to please and are captured by the regulated. As a
former head of the General Accounting Office noted regarding corporate
auditors, "[i]f you get too friendly and too relaxed, you can wind up
nodding your head yes when you should be saying no." ' And a fatal
mistake sometimes made is to appoint an individual to the FAR position
because he or she is known in the athletics department as one of the
term, renewable one time, for a maximum of six years. A FAR designate is designated in the last

year of the incumbent's term. See University Standing Committees and Task Forces, available at
http://committees.ua.edu/secii/iacliac.html.

70. Jane Mayer, The Accountant's War, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 22, 2002, at 64.
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"friendly faculty."7 The story of faculty members who succumb to outside
pressure has been chronicled elsewhere and will not be told again here.72
It is also a story that is sometimes told to the Committee on Infractions in
cases involving academic fraud.
At some institutions, being the FAR is like being Dean of Chastity in
a high school. That is, no matter how much you instruct, warn, and
describe the risks of noncompliant behavior, you get the feeling that there
are greater forces at work that will overcome all of the careful planning and
rules compliance entreaties. In such an environment, the FAR position
becomes even more important, because people within the athletics
department who want to operate within the rules and athletics directors
who value the educational mission deserve faculty support. Academic
tenure and a reporting line outside of the athletics department strengthen
the hand of the FAR in matters relating to admissions, retention, eligibility,
rules compliance, and student-athlete welfare.
There are many national initiatives within the NCAA and elsewhere,
focusing on reform in college athletics. At NCAA conventions and other
national gatherings, everyone is a "reformer." It is easy to talk reform on
a macro scale, particularly when you are among people who have similar
values. But the real question is how much impact one has and how much
of a force you are when you return to campus. The real test is whether you
can say "no" on an admissions decision, or whether you will follow
through in investigating a potential rules violation, even when pursuing the
issue is very unpopular and may lead to the possible loss of the eligibility
of the player. It is meaningful activity and tough decisionmaking at the
local level that makes for real reform in college athletics, rather than
flowery pronouncements issued for consumption by the national media.
Many of the toughest and most principled decisions made in athletics never
become a headline in a local paper.
Separate from the issue of the duties of the FAR in day-to-day dealings
is the role the FAR should play in a major infractions case involving the

71. See L. John Wertheim& Don Yaeger, The Passing Game, SPORTS ILLUS., June 14, 1999,
at 90 (noting that, "[F]riendly faculty" exist at every school, and are known to the individuals in
the athletic department. One professor who commented on the issue stated, "No one can say that
giving tickets or trips to faculty is a good thing, but if there are faculty who are willing to do things
for athletes, you don't have to corrupt them, you just have to find them.").
72. See id.
73. In a recent publication from the NCAA, the President of the NCAA, Cedric W. Dempsey,
notes that the Division I governance structure is considering a set of incentives and disincentives
in the area of academic reform and eligibility standards. But he also notes: "However, the real will
to act on this issue is the will to set local standards for recruiting, local expectations for enrolled
student-athletes and local accountability for linking outstanding athletic performance with real
academic success." The Will To Act Project:Division lAcademic Reform, THE NCAA NEWS, Sept.
16, 2002, availableat http://www.ncaa.orglnews/2002120020916/active/3919n04.html.
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institution. Professor Charles Alan Wright, former Chairman of the NCAA
Committee on Infractions, noted that the ability, experience, and integrity
of any one individual is more important than any generality, in describing
who should lead the investigation for a university in a major infractions
case. 4 The observations made by Professor Wright ring true to this day.
No matter what role the institution chooses for the FAR, the
involvement of the FAR is important in all infractions matters. The
institution should have an established written policy for conducting
internal investigations. The FAR should be informed of all minor
investigations or infractions no later than when reports are filed with the
conference office or the NCAA. The FAR should play an important role in
any major institutional inquiry into alleged or suspected rules violations.
In particular, the FAR should have the opportunity to interview witnesses,
question athletics department personnel, and examine documents as
needed. In addition, the FAR should play a central role in preparation of
any infractions report submitted to the conference office or the NCAA.75
The participation of the FAR in the investigation and reporting of the case
is especially important in cases involving allegations of academic fraud.
One disadvantage of having the FAR on point in an investigation, rather
than merely as a member of the investigative team, is that whoever is at the
wheel of an investigation cannot afford to allow friendships and
relationships to get in the way of the search for the truth. The questions
asked in a major NCAA case may be embarrassing, incriminating, and
raise issues that threaten careers. A FAR on point in an investigation may
end up damaging long-standing relationships, if the coaches and
administrators survive the inquiry. University attorneys or outside counsel
do not have that baggage, because they will not be regular players in the
athletics department once the case is completed. The CEO must assess the
likely long-term impact on the FAR position if the FAR is going to be
directing the questioning of university employees, student-athletes, and
representatives ofathletics interests (boosters). This may be one more item

74. Wright, supranote 19, at 23. Professor Wright made the following observation regarding
the use of a law professor to lead an investigation:
Normally, a law professor would not seem to be very well suited for this task, but
the most impressive investigation and presentation I saw in my years on the
committee was made by a professor at the institution's law school. The professor
in question had useful experience in private practice, and teaches Criminal
Procedure, Evidence and Practice Court. He did a superb job.

Id. at 23 n.3.
75. See Beth DeBauche, The Role of the FAR in Investigations: Guidelines (May 2001) (on
file with author). These observations are drawn in part from a memorandum by Associate
Commissioner Beth DeBauche circulated within the SEC in May of 2001. See id.
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to add to the list of advantages for a FAR term limit, if the institution is
likely to continue to be involved in NCAA cases. Outside of athletics, such
as in the regulation of financial institutions, regulators are moved around.
It may be that the same considerations should be made if the FAR is going
to be the lead dog in investigations.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR: WALKING POINT
As noted previously, the institution's CEO is ultimately held

accountable for the conduct of the athletics program. 6 At a practical level,
however, the athletics director (AD) will have a far greater impact on the
attitude of institutional staff members, coaches, student-athletes, and
boosters towards NCAA rules compliance than any other person on
campus. If an AD is no-nonsense when it comes to policing the program
and emphasizing rules compliance, the message will be clear. Although the
AD sets the tone, NCAA rules compliance hardly defines the job of an AD.
Happily so. Many ADs spend a great deal of their time dealing with parties
external to the university in fund-raising, the negotiation of contracts,
speaking engagements, and related matters. Back at the ranch, it is the
compliance director whose job is defined in the title-NCAA, conference,
and institutional rules compliance. It is the compliance director who walks
the point, far more than the FAR or any other institutional representative,
in trying to keep the school in the road.
A compliance director in a major program is an educator, arbitrator,
mediator, advocate, enforcer, and not infrequently, the fall-guy. Given the
infusion of millions of dollars into major college athletics, the resultant
pressure to win and the never-ending quest of purportedly well-meaning
individuals to get into the inner circle of the department, a compliance
director has the most difficult job in college athletics. All of the conflicting
agendas in the Wild West of college athletics today meet at one pinpoint
of the campus map-the door that reads "Associate Athletics Director for
Compliance." The magnitude and importance of the job is reflected in the
job title, credentials, and specialization, which is quite a change from not
too many years ago when athletics departments often assigned NCAA
compliance and rules education to a coach who no longer wanted to coach,
or to an individual who also carried additional job responsibilities, such as
media relations or business affairs.
Compliance directors now often have law degrees, carry the title of
"Associate Athletics Director," and often have several staff members in the
compliance area who focus on issues such as financial aid, eligibility, and
all of the other NCAA and conference rules applicable to all areas of the
athletics department. Given the scope of the job, it is a mistake to have a
76. See supra note 9.
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compliance director who is assigned compliance responsibility as only part
of his or her job description." It is also a mistake to have the compliance
area thinly staffed beyond the position of director. In the event the
institution gets involved in the investigation of a major infraction, which
can span a year or more, other important elements of compliance, such as
rules education, must continue. 7 ' In an age where major college football
and basketball programs are staffed with individuals to handle specialized
assignments in coaching, logistics, medical care, academic support, and so
on, it is a foolish mistake to have the compliance office thinly staffed.
Running compliance with a duct tape mentality sends a lousy message,
simply does not work, and will cause considerable discomfort should the
institution find itself on the wrong end of an NCAA inquiry. Institutions
appearing before the Committee on Infractions often cite "additional
professional staffing" as one of the corrective measures, recognizing that
the previous arrangement may have led to the problems of failure to
monitor or lack of institutional control. Before a major infractions case
occurs a CEO should ensure that the staffing of the compliance area is
adequate, heading offproblems before the NCAA enforcement staff comes
calling.
For the sake of the message it sends, but more importantly, for
effectiveness, the director of compliance should have access to the CEO on
those occasions-although they may be infrequent-when there is pressure
within the athletics department or from outside actors to treat a compliance
or infractions matter with kid gloves. Whether it is in direct reporting to
the CEO or the university counsel's office, there should be no question that
although the athletics department may be paying the salary of the
compliance director, the chief responsibility is to the institution and the
individual who is ultimately held accountable for institutional control, the
CEO. Whether the relationship between the compliance director and the
university president is described as "dotted line" or even more direct, the
compliance director must feel confident, particularly in the face of
criticism by boosters, coaches, and others, that the CEO or his or her
designee outside the athletics department has an open door for working
through a difficult case or simply reporting a problem. If a compliance

77. The Committee on Infractions has warned of the risk of assigning compliance to a
subordinate who lacks sufficient authority to have confidence or respect of others. See Principles
oflnstitutional Control As Prepared by the NCAA DivisionI Committee on Infractions,supra note

13.
78. See Carroll Rogers, Cleaning Up the SEC, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 18, 2002, at E9

(describing the role of the compliance director in a fourteen-month investigation of the University
of Alabama football program). At the end of the investigation, the institution submitted a 1,600
page report that was the result of nearly a dozen trips out of state and many interviews of coaches,
boosters, student-athletes, and staff members. See id.
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director is pressured in any way to spin the facts, it can damage the school.
It becomes almost silly to attach such melodrama to events surrounding
athletics competition of college students, but the reality in a big-time
program is that the pressures are real, attempts to influence or steer
investigations are well-documented, and institutional implications are
severe-not to mention that the careers and good names of individuals are
at stake. Although it is generally healthy and appropriate to observe a chain
of command, a compliance director must know that if push comes to
shove, the CEO's door is open. This not only helps the institution, but also
the AD, who may be caught between powerful forces. Knowing that the
CEO is involved usually causes people to back off.
One of the most important contributions a compliance director can
make is to establish a written protocol for the investigation and reporting
of NCAA infractions and to make sure all of the interested parties, such as,
the AD, university counsel, and CEO buy into and observe the plan. If a
coach ignores the protocol and tips off a student-athlete on the direction of
a possible inquiry before a critical interview, the coach should be
sanctioned, if not fired. Any individual who compromises the integrity of
an investigation should be dealt with accordingly, with no excuses
accepted. Once a written protocol is adopted and circulated to the coaches,
no one should be granted an exception for any act that reflects poorly on
the school or threatens the integrity of the investigation. Any attempt to
coach witnesses, make sure "our story is straight," or otherwise interfere
with an investigation should be a career-ending move at that institution. To
do anything less may lead to more harsh outcomes when the Committee on
Infractions is weighing penalties in the face of individuals who have been
retained by the institution after having compromised an investigation. Both
the individual and the institution that failed to respond to an attempt to
impede an investigation will be at risk.
In happier days, when an institution is not under the cloud of an NCAA
inquiry that might involve a major violation, the relationship between the
compliance office and coaches must be based on trust, recognizing that the
compliance director is at times an advocate for the coaches and studentathletes. A significant part of the compliance director's job is to assist
coaches with day-to-day interpretations of the rules, to help coaches
achieve desired objectives within both the letter and spirit of the rules. This
aspect of the job requires compliance directors to avoid becoming "Dr.
No," but instead to listen to the coach's question, assess and discuss the
objective, and research the NCAA rule book and any related interpretations
in order to determine whether there is a way to legally achieve the coach's
objective. A coach who knows that the compliance director will look at
every angle before rendering an opinion will be more accepting of a "no"
answer when it must be given. Among the difficulties of the compliance
job is being an advocate for a coach one day, but a possible investigator of
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the coach on the next, should allegations of a violation occur. One of the
most effective ways to reduce this tension is to follow the written protocol
for investigations so that coaches will understand that the institution's
standard operating procedure is simply being followed and that the inquiry,
should it occur, is not personal and will be the same no matter which
individual or sport is involved. Coaches who are mature professionals will
understand that inquiries will occur from time to time, as an inevitable byproduct of coaching in a big-time program. In asking tough questions and
even playing the devil's advocate to ensure that there is institutional
control and proper monitoring, the compliance director is simply doing the
same thing a coach does in handling the team. It is a very difficult position,
made even more difficult and complex in recent years due to the increasing
pressure to win while complying with 460 pages of rules.79
Coaches and others will sometimes pander to the public in complaining
about "those stupid NCAA rules," most especially if the coach is at the
wrong end of an NCAA inquiry built around a rules violation. Some
coaches sound like a combination of Joe McCarthy and Elmer Gantry in
playing to the public, in their attempt to direct attention away from their
wrongdoing. What people, and most especially the press, need to keep in
mind is that the rule book got to be as thick as it is through a process of
proposals made by and voted in by the member institutions. The image
some try to create of "the NCAA" creating all of the rules is erased by
looking into a mirror, because rules are often adopted to end practices
developed and implemented by coaches over time that, while technically
within existing rules, still create a real or perceived competitive or
recruiting advantage. NCAA staff members do not sit in Indianapolis and
crank out new legislation, like Santa's Little Helpers working on the
Christmas toys. The easy answer to a coach railing about the rules is a
reminder that the odds are that the very institution being examined for
compliance with the rule probably voted in favor of it in the legislative
process. It is all too convenient to bash the regulatory agency in an attempt
to divert attention away from the wrongdoing. The NCAA is not "them."
The NCAA is "us" when it comes to the promulgation of rules.
One of the most difficult and sensitive issues that can land at the feet
of a compliance director is a question relating to possible academic fraud,
either prior to or after the student-athlete's enrollment. "A basic purpose
of [the NCAA] is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
79. The 2002-03 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, is 460 pages from start to finish. It is best
to think of the NCAA MANUAL in the same way you would use the Chicago phonebook. You do
not need to know it or read it from cover to cover; you do need to know how to use it, to find what

you need.
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intercollegiate athletics and professional sports."' 0 The philosophy of the
membership is that student-athletes should be students first, and athletes
second. But the reality is a role reversal in the minds of many people,
including some of the student-athletes themselves. The greatest difficulties
arise when the educational system at the high school or college level is
subverted to make or keep a student-athlete eligible." If there are
allegations relating to possible test fraud or transcript issues at the high
school, the institution should follow its written protocol for handling
similar problems relating to all applicants. Possible academic fraud is an
area where the compliance director needs and deserves the support of the
admissions office, FAR, and if need be, the CEO, if there is pressure to cut
a comer in the investigation of academic fraud.
Although it is not mandated in any NCAA bylaw, it is imperative that
an institution have a written policy whereby any extraordinary increase in
a prospective student-athlete's' 2 test score is identified and questioned. The
standard should be the same as that applied to all incoming students,
although the ramifications of playing a student-athlete who is proven to be
ineligible due to pre-enrollment academic fraud may be far more

80. NCAA CONST. art. 1.3. 1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at
81. Elsa Cole, Forewordto 28 J.C.& U.L. 515 (2002), recently noting:

!.

The pressure to have a winning program means pressure to have great players.
Problems arise when those student prospects have academic credentials that are
secondary to their athletic prowess. NCAA member colleges have struggled to
create a fair, unbiased set of minimal academic criteria that a student must meet
who wants to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the Division I or Division
II level his or her first year in college.
82. NCAA Bylaw 13.02.9, reprinted In NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 88 providing:
A prospective student-athlete ("prospect") is a student who has started classes for
the ninth grade. In addition, a student who has not started classes for the ninth
grade becomes a prospective student-athlete if the institution provides such an

individual (or the individual's relatives or friends) any financial assistance or other
benefits that the institution does not provide to prospective students generally. An
individual remains a prospective student-athlete until one of the following occurs
(whichever is earlier):
(a) The individual officially registers and enrolls in a
minimum full-time program of studies and attends classes
in any term of a four-year collegiate institution's regular
academic year (excluding summer); or
(b) The individual participates in a regular squad practice or
competition at a four-year collegiate institution that occurs
before the beginning of any term.
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significant than a similar scenario involving a non-athlete, where the
fallout rarely involves an institutional sanction.
Although testing agencies may be of some help in this area, the
institution should not assume that the testing agency will resolve the case
to the satisfaction of the school and the NCAA. 3 If the coaches or other
institutional staff members know more about what took place at the high
school than the testing agency, lack of initiative by the university could be
evidence of lack of institutional control, most especially if there has been
a dramatic jump in the score. The institutional investigation could include
a review of the student's entire academic record in combination with the
test scores, a question and answer session with the student, and a visit to
the student-athlete's high school to talk to guidance counselors or other
officials to determine if the administration of the test was out of the
ordinary.
If the institution has submitted a request to the testing agency for
investigation and verification of the score, or the institution has otherwise
begun its own investigation of the score, the institution should not admit
the student, and therefore not allow the student to report for practice until
the testing agency responds to the inquiry or the institution has concluded
its own internal investigation to its full satisfaction. Taking a firm stance
on an admissions decision is the most likely time when the compliance
director, FAR, and admissions officer will start to feel the heat from
coaches, boosters, and others because such issues are invariably not
resolved prior to the start of pre-season football practice in early August.

83. There is a significant body of literature dealing with the detection of cheating on collegeentrance exams. For a critical look at how the Educational Testing Service questions test scores,
see Walter M. Haney, Cheating and Escheating on Standardized Tests, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (1999) (on file with the authors).
Haney provides an alternative perspective to the one given in the official literature of the
Educational Testing Service. See id.
In 1997, Dr. Tom Burish (now President of Washington and Lee University), who was then
Provost and the FAR at Vanderbilt University, made a presentation to the FARs of the SEC on the
issue of when to question the validity of test scores. Tom Burish, When to Question the Validity
of Test Scores, Address to FARs of the Southeastern Conference (May 18, 1997) (on file with the
authors). The score review process utilized by American College Testing and the Educational
Testing Service was discussed, as well as the factors that can explain significant jumps in test
scores. See id.
At the 1998-99 NCAA Regional Compliance Seminars, members of the NCAA enforcement
staffdistributed materials (on file with authors) and made a presentation on test fraud and test-score
cancellation, with an overview of institutional responsibility in this area. Common methods utilized
by cheaters were outlined, as well as the protocol used by American College Testing (ACT) and the
Educational Testing Service in the cancellation of scores. Walter M. Haney Center for the Study
of Testing, Evaluation and Educational Policy, Cheating and Escheating on Standardized Tests,
(paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association,
Atlanta, Ga., Apr. 15, 1993) (on file with authors).
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This is exactly when the compliance director, FAR, and admissions officer
must hold firm and not succumb to pressures to admit the student before
the inquiry is completed. To do otherwise will most certainly result in a
major infractions inquiry ifthe test score is subsequently invalidated by the
testing agency, yet was used by the university for admission and
certification of eligibility.
Another prescription for trouble is when a coach wants a prospective
student-athlete who did not meet the eligibility requirements to enroll fulltime at the institution, to move to the institution's community and enroll
part-time at the university to either earn credits necessary for transfer, or
simply take a few college courses while he or she retakes the ACT or SAT
to try to achieve the qualifying score needed. While there is no NCAA rule
prohibiting such a practice, it certainly is sound compliance policy to
prohibit such activity. If a prospective student-athlete does not meet the
eligibility requirements to enroll full-time, then that student is eligible for
recruitment again by all institutions. Therefore, all recruiting rules (e.g., no
more than one phone call per week," limited number of contacts with the
prospect,85 restrictions on when the prospect can be contacted by coaches
off-campus, 6 and restrictions on current student-athletes making contact
with the prospect off-campus 87) continue to apply to this student.
Assume the prospective student-athlete moves to the institution's
community and does not enroll at the university or only enrolls part-time.
The questions that immediately come to mind are: Where is the prospect
living? How did he or she find those accommodations? How is the student
paying for rent? Further assume it is October and the prospect goes to the
mall, and one of the football or basketball coaches sees the prospect at the
mall and begins a conversation that lasts longer than an exchange of
greetings with the young man. This occurrence is a violation because it did
not occur during a permissible time period when football or basketball
coaches can contact a recruit off-campus.88 Similarly, if a current studentathlete takes the prospect out for dinner at a local establishment, or gives
the prospect a ride to the restaurant, a violation would occur because
current student-athletes are not permitted to have off-campus contacts with
prospective student-athletes or provide them with rides on or around
campus.89 Allowing a prospective student-athlete who is still a recruitable
prospect to move to the institution's community before full-time
enrollment is therefore a risky proposition likely to result in violations.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See NCAA Bylaw 13.1.3.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 92.
See NCAA Bylaw 13.1.6, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 95.
See NCAA Bylaw 13.1.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 94.
See, e.g., NCAA Bylaw 11.7.2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 61.
See NCAA Bylaw 13.1.6, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 95.
See NCAA Bylaw 13.02.5. 1 (a), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 87.
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Again, while not mandated, the sound compliance practice is to implement
a policy prohibiting prospects, who are not eligible, from enrolling parttime at the institution and from moving to the institution's community
prior to full-time enrollment. Several major infractions cases have involved
institutions that ran afoul of the rules in this area."
A coach may contend that having such restrictive policies in
challenging test scores or discouraging the move to campus creates a
disadvantage because a competitor does not question a prospect's test
scores, or even if they do, they still admit the student and allow the student
to report for practice. Coaches may also contend that a competing
institution will allow prospects who do not meet the eligibility
requirements to enroll part-time at the institution in order to gain the
necessary requirements for eligibility. These are only a few of the
situations that will test the resolve of a compliance director. Ultimately, the
compliance director must operate with the complete support of the CEO,
AD, and FAR to enforce policies and practices that will protect the
academic mission and integrity of the institution, without regard to what
other institutions and their staff may be doing. In the end, the compliance
director must always remember, even when coaches and boosters do not,
that no one prospective student-athlete is bigger than the university and its
mission, and therefore it is better to err on the side of caution than to risk
far greater consequences. One of the most serious findings in an infractions
case is the presence of a situation where academic fraud should have been
detected. The clear message to coaches is that they should back off when
an inquiry relating to academic fraud is underway and let the investigation
proceed in the hands of others. Making a hurried decision in order to have
the student-athlete join the team is a common mistake that surfaces in
infractions cases involving academic fraud, and it rarely results in anything
but additional penalties for the school. The desire of the coach and the
student to have the matter resolved quickly is understandable, but the cost
to the institution of being wrong is not worth the risk.
VII. FINDING THE TRUTH, WHETHER IT HELPS OR HURTS

As noted previously, the late Charles Alan Wright, a distinguished legal
scholar at the University of Texas and former Chairman of the NCAA
Committee on Infractions, wrote an article in 1984 wherein he provided his
recommendations for responding to an Official Inquiry from the NCAA. 9'
The article is refreshing in its clarity, most especially in contrast to so
much of the literature surrounding NCAA matters that is filled with
90. See California State University, Northridge, Public Infraction Report (June I, 2000);
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Public Infraction Report (Dec. 12, 2000).
91. Wright, supra note 19.
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pabulum, never addressing the conflicting agendas that exist in big-time
sports. On the question of whether the institution should assume the
mentality of a crusty defense lawyer in civil litigation (i.e., "if they don't

ask, we're not telling") or must operate with a different set of values,
Professor Wright advised: "The president must be sure that the lawyer who
is investigating for him is acting in the interest of both the president and
the university and shares their desireto find the truth, whether it helps or
hurts. '9 2 These few words will strike some people as not worthy of much
thought or comment, sounding a bit like apple pie or the Boy Scout
Motto. 93 But the decision to find and report the truth to the extent that it
can be found-whether it helps or hurts-is not automatic in the minds
of many fans, coaches, and others who believe that "win at all costs"
should be added to the Boy Scout Motto and who believe that what the
institutional representatives should do is play a cat-and-mouse game with

the NCAA. Some people have their own version of an NCAA manual,
which evidently includes a bylaw that reads "Thou Shalt Obfuscate."
The search for the truth in civil litigation is necessarily achieved
through an adversarial process.95 The search for the truth is the same
purpose that motivates most of the parties in an NCAA infractions process
to do what they do, but the people who work in compliance on a regular
basis, such as compliance directors and FARs, will not likely view the
process as adversarial-at least they will not start that way. They will view
the process as being a cooperative enterprise and consistent with many of
92. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
93. "A Scout is Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly, Courteous, Kind, Obedient, Cheerful,
Thrifty, Brave, Clean and Reverent." Boyscouts.com, Motto-Slogan-Oath, available at
www.boyscouts.com/motto.htm.
94. Finding the truth in an infractions case is a lot more difficult than it sounds to the
uninitiated. Lacking subpoena power, the NCAA enforcement staff often fails to obtain an interview
with critical witnesses or critical bank and telephone records. Some cases are too weird and involve
too many shifting stories to ever lead one to believe that the final story has been captured, much less
the right one. One lawyer, who worked on behalf of an institution in a major infractions case, that
wishes to remain anonymous, told the authors that although the NCAA Committee on Infractions
may have made a finding of fact and bought into a particular version of a story, the evidence,
motivations, characters, and personalities involved hardly lend much comfort to the notion that the
final chapter has been written or will ever be known. As is true in civil litigation, the Committee
on Infractions, like a court, may be "right" only because it was the last to decide. Many NCAA
infractions cases are filled with larger than life personalities, with you-won't-believe-this behavior,
leading one to believe they must be reading good fiction, rather than fact, in an NCAA Committee
on Infractions report. And in some cases where the Committee on Infractions decision is final,
subsequent discovery in related civil or criminal litigation may draw into question previous findings
by the Committee.
95. Linda Alle-Murphy, Comment, Are Compulsory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Contracts Enforceable? A Contractual Analysis, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 125, 125 (2002) (noting that
"viewed from the noblest perspective possible, the purpose of the judicial process in this country
is the search for truth").
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the other NCAA rules initiatives and proceedings, which are in no way
adversarial. Individuals such as compliance directors, FARs, and SWAs,
who work with NCAA staff members throughout the year on rules
interpretations and proactive and preventative compliance matters, will not
likely shift to the view that an investigation of a rules violation creates a
prosecutorial, "us versus them" proceeding, no matter how much
institutional or outside lawyers may lean that way. Institutional and outside
lawyers who try to control an institution's response and even ever so
slightly try to engage in spin are setting up the institution and the CEO for
a fall. Institutional and outside lawyers who deal with the NCAA
episodically, only in the context of a potential infractions case, are like
lawyers in a litigation firm who move from a products liability case to a
lender liability case to a medical malpractice matter. Like a viewer with a
channel changer, a civil litigator changes channels, clients, and
controversies with regularity. She generally has no professional investment
in the model and the system that the NCAA membership has adopted, and
will not necessarily care about any fractured relationships left behind after
a case is over. Coaches, ADs, FARs, and compliance directors, however,
will generally stay in the system, even after an infractions case is over. To
the extent that FARs and compliance directors are in quasi-lawyer and
regulatory roles, their relationship with the institution and the NCAA is
necessarily richer, more permanent, and more akin to a lawyer who has a
client in a long-standing advisory relationship, outside of the context of
episodic litigation. The result is that members of a university "team" who
are responding to an Official Inquiry from the NCAA may bring very
different perspectives and motivations to the table, which unquestionably
can influence the content and tone of an institution's response if one view
(cooperative) carries the day over the other (adversarial). The choice the
CEO makes-and there can be no real delegation of this decision unless
a governing board improperly tries to intervene--can have a profound
outcome on the case if there is even the slightest waft of smoke suggesting
that the institution is getting cute in its response or trying to deflect
attention away from the truth. As Professor Wright noted, whether it helps
or hurts, the goal should be to find the truth.96
It is a major mistake to allow a governing board to intervene in shaping
the institution's strategy in a major infractions case. Improper intervention
alone may be an indicator that the institution has failed the test of
institutional control. Two general principles articulated in the NCAA
Manual should be read and understood by every board member, and never
forgotten. Unlike so many NCAA rules, these two are brief and easy to
understand. No one needs to run out and get an interpretation from NCAA

96. Wright, supra note 19, at 23.
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Membership Services to know what they mean. The first is Article 6.01.1,
which provides: "The control and responsibility for the conduct of
intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised by the institution and by the
conference(s), if any, of which it is a member. Administrative control or
faculty control, or a combination of the two, shall constitute institutional
control. 97 The other provision that establishes the primacy of the position
of the CEO is Article 6.1.1, which provides: "A member institution's CEO
has ultimate responsibility and final authority for the conduct of the
intercollegiate athletics program andthe actions ofany boardin control of
that program."98
A study of those NCAA provisions and even a passing knowledge of
the real world of infractions cases is that it is the CEO-not the board, the
AD, the FAR, the compliance director, SWA, or others-who is ultimately
accountable for the institution's behavior as a member of the NCAA.
Anyone who has ever witnessed a hearing before the Committee on
Infractions knows that the CEO is the alpha and omega of the institution's
day before the Committee. The CEO is seated at the head of the
institution's table, and he or she makes the equivalent of an opening and
closing statement to the Committee on Infractions-one parallel to a jury
trial.
The arrangement of the institutional representatives at the table in a
hearing before the Committee on Infractions is both substantive and
symbolic. The institutional representatives sit on one side of a long table,
with the CEO at the end closest to the Committee. But it is as though the
table is on a slight tilt. Every marble that any institutional representative
places on the table, either in the accumulated record or during the course
of the day, runs downhill to the CEO. The marble may pause in front of the
AD or coach, but it keeps on rolling down to the chief. Any board member
who has ever been tempted to intervene in an institution's infractions
response should remember that at the end of the hearing and on judgment
day (when the Committee on Infractions releases its opinion), the CEO will
be holding all the marbles.
There is no question that responsible board members will want to
know, and have a right to know, the major issues in an athletics
department, but their passion for college athletics should not cause them
to try to micro-manage an athletics department, no matter how great the
allure. Many a president at major college football powers has said, "I wish
my board members were as interested about our academics as they are
about athletics." So true. College athletics is great fun and there is nothing
like sitting in the president's box on Saturday to experience the spirit of
97. NCAA CONST. art. 6.01.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 49.
98. NCAA CONST. art. 6.1.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 49 (emphasis
added).
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what college football can bring to an academic institution. Board members
should, however, regularly remind themselves that intervention in athletics
is a dangerous game, and especially if the institution is in the middle of an
infractions case. Outside of social events, alumni gatherings, and similar
enterprises, any direct contact between a coach and board member on
important substantive matters undercuts the CEO and the AD, but even
more importantly, imperils the institution on the issue of institutional
control. Similarly, no CEO should be receptive to an entreaty from a head
coach who is trying to cut the AD out of an important issue, such as a
contract renewal or a potential infractions matter.
There is no question that a CEO who does not keep a governing board
apprised of a major development in athletics (especially if it is a major
NCAA infractions matter that looks likely to lead to a Preliminary Inquiry
Letter) will not be long for this world, especially if a newspaper breaks a
story that has been percolating within the athletics department and
president's office for weeks. At the same time, the CEO is usually in a
lousy position, caught between the advice that lawyers and the NCAA
often give, that secrecy in an investigation is of primary importance, and
the likely wrath of board members who feel that they need to be made
aware of these major developments in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties
as board members. College board members at major Division I-A schools
will quickly note that although they are often criticized for alleged
improper intervention or for prying into athletic matters, there is probably
no other area that brings more phone calls or inquiries to them than does
a major story that has developed relating to athletics. As was noted in Part
II above, telephones ring off the hook and careers come crashing down on
matters relating to intercollegiate athletics far more regularly than they
should, but there is no denying the reality that exists in the public and
private politics of a major football power house.
Most of the readers of this Essay will probably never be on the
receiving end of a Preliminary Inquiry Letter from the NCAA, signed by
the Vice-President for Enforcement Services." The extent to which the
membership of the NCAA has rejected the adversarial model in the search
for the truth in an infractions case is demonstrated in the following

99. According to NCAA Bylaw 32.2.2.4, a Preliminary Inquiry Letter is sent to the CEO
when information has been developed to indicate that violations requiring further in-person
investigation may have occurred. The letter advises the CEO that the enforcement staff will be
undertaking a preliminary investigation and that the investigation will be conducted under the
direction of the vice-president for enforcement services. In the event the allegations appear to be
of a substantial nature, the institution may receive an Official Inquiry Letter, which usually signhils
the start of a major infractions case. See NCAA Bylaw 32.2.2.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 8, at 414-15; see also NCAA Bylaw 32.5.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note
8, at 418 (outlining the contents of an Official Inquiry Letter).
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paragraph, taken from a Preliminary Inquiry Letter received by a major

institution in 2001:
The enforcement program of the NCAA is a cooperative
undertaking involving individual member institutions and
allied conferences working together through the NCAA-a
unified effort designed to improve the administration of
intercollegiate athletics. You are called upon as a chief
for your
executive officer of the University of
cooperation and assistance to the end that complete
information related to this matter may be developed."°
Beyond the content of the Preliminary Inquiry Letter, there are a number
of NCAA bylaws that establish the principle that the responsibilities of
institutions and individuals involved in an NCAA investigation go well
beyond the minimalist, answer-only-what's-asked approach that is
appropriate in legal venues. The NCAA bylaw on exemplary conduct
establishes that much more is expected of individuals employed or

associated with member institutions than is expected of less critically
placed citizens."' And the bylaw establishing the responsibility to
cooperate in NCAA enforcement matters makes it clear that institutional
representatives who intend to stay in good standing are required to give full
and complete disclosure of any relevant information."e2 Nowhere does it

100. Preliminary Inquiry Letter (2001) (on file with authors).
101. See NCAA Bylaw 19.01.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 31, providing:
Individuals employed by or associated with member institutions for the
administration, the conduct or the coaching of intercollegiate athletics are, in the
final analysis, teachers of young people. Their responsibility is an affirmative one,
and they must do more than avoid improper conduct or questionable acts. Their
own moral values must be so certain and positive that those younger and more
pliable will be influenced by a fine example. Much more is expected of them than
of the less critically placed citizen.
102. NCAA Bylaw 19.01.3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 311, providing:
All representatives of member institutions shall cooperate fully with the NCAA
enforcement staff, Committee on Infractions, Infractions Appeals Committee and
Management Council to further the objectives of the Association and its
enforcement program. The enforcement policies and procedures are an essential
part of the intercollegiate athletics program of each member institution and require
full and complete disclosure by all institutional representatives of any relevant
information requested by the NCAA enforcement staff, Committee on Infractions
or Infractions Appeals Committee during the course of an inquiry.
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say that they are required to do so only if asked.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A major infractions case involving a collegiate powerhouse in football
or basketball will bring a great deal of negative attention and present the
institution with difficult choices in responding publicly and privately to the
NCAA inquiry. Ethical dilemmas, moral conflicts, and competing
strategies will be placed before the CEO, who is charged with the
responsibility of maintaining institutional control in day-to-day compliance
matters and the responsibility of fashioning the institution's response to an
Official Inquiry Letter. Many university presidents are measured by how
to a major infractions case.
respond
theyUpon
receipt of a Preliminary Inquiry Letter from the NCAA, a
university will be at a crossroad. There is no question that all of the
institutional representatives share a common purpose in trying to minimize
the damage to the school. But, it is the CEO who is in the hot seat and will
have to make the difficult choice of whether the institution will live by the
cooperative principles adopted by the membership, or will adopt an
institutional strategy that more clearly resembles the position of a defense
lawyer defending a deposition in civil litigation, where the acceptable
position is "if they don't ask, we don't tell." More than any other
individual involved in an infractions case, the CEO will have to weigh the
interests of the institution, the membership, and institutional
representatives in charting the course for the institution's investigation and
response.
Full cooperation with the NCAA may bring scorn from the faithful,
questions from the governing board, and frankly, no guarantee that the
penalties will be less severe. But anything less than full cooperation will
come ai a greater price, which will not be measured in scholarship losses
or post-season bans. The most precious of all assets is the soul of the
institution; thus, the choice Professor Wright suggested must be made in
pursuing the truth, whether it helps or hurts.
The NCAA infractions process operates on a higher plane than the civil
litigation model. It is essentially a self-contained, academic proceeding,
administered by individuals who elect to operate under the cooperative
principle by virtue of their involvement in an athletics program that holds
a seat at the NCAA's table. It is not an adversarial model. Members of the
Committee on Infractions and the Infractions Appeals Committee, no
matter how many law degrees they hold, are first and foremost
administrators of a system that more closely resembles the workings of an
academic honor code than a trial in civil litigation. It is not a perfect

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/2

42

Marsh and Robbins: Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership and Ins
20031

WEIGHING THE INTERESTS IN AN NCAA INVFSIGATION

709

system, but there is currently no move to change the way the system
operates.
Student-athletes learn a great deal in the classroom and on the field.
Their education continues as they watch their coaches, athletics
administrators, and CEOs respond to an NCAA investigation. If what they
observe is a group of people trying to spin the truth and denigrate both the
process and the regulators, those students will become the corporate
leaders of tomorrow who engage in insider trading, produce false financial
statements, and try to blame the regulatory agency for all the problems. The
alternative is to teach by example by finding the truth, acknowledging
errors, enduring the penalties, and moving on with the ethical rudder
undamaged and the integrity of the institution as the guiding principle. The
complexities, public attention, and political heat in a major football or
basketball infractions case are grossly out of proportion to what are, after
all, games played by young men. The choice made by the CEO can never
be wrong, outcomes aside, if the guiding principle is to find and report the
truth.
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